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Following the UK’s 1980s privatization
initiative, there has been increased interest in
whether private operators’ involvement in
public service provision improves efficiency.
Scholars formerly thought that an ownership
change itself positively impacts a firm’s
performance (for instance, Megginson and
Netter, 2001). However, this is now being widely
questioned (Shaoul, 2003; Estache et al., 2009;
Nellis, 2012; Hong, 2016).
New empirical evidence is presented here
on ownership’s impact on economic efficiency
in light of a recent ‘privatization’  of part of
South Korea’s urban rail transit system (the
term ‘privatization’ is used in this paper to
encompass concessions and partial ownership
transfers).
This paper makes several contributions to
the academic literature. First, the type of
privatization considered in this study is a
public–private partnership (PPP). Although
there are many types of PPP (Hodge and
Greve, 2007), the defining characteristics of a
typical PPP are bundling service provision with
other tasks, including construction and
financing, into a single long-term contract;
and risk-sharing between the public and private
sectors (Engel et al., 2009, 2010; Iossa and
Martimort, 2009). Despite numerous
theoretical discussions of PPPs, empirical
investigations have been relatively scarce
(Acerete et al., 2009).
Second, this paper is one of the first to
present empirical evidence on the impact of
ownership in the context of an urban rail
transit system. Whether publicly- or privately-
owned, urban rail transit is often considered a
sector that cannot be run profitably (Gomez-
Ibanez and Meyer, 1993; Shaoul, 2002).
Nevertheless, numerous attempts, using PPPs
or other types of privatization, have been made
to improve the efficiency of rail transit systems
in a number of world cities, including Bangkok,
Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Hong Kong, and
Seoul (Phang, 2007). Empirical evidence on
these new urban transportation modes,
however, is rare. This paper fills this gap by
exploring the Seoul urban rail transit system
(Railway Technology, 2013; Carpintero and
Petersen, 2014).
Third, earlier studies have assessed
ownership’s impact in terms of profit. Evaluated
with such a measure, state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) show dismal losses (Aharoni, 2000).
However, profitability is a flawed efficiency
metric when comparing privately-owned and
state-owned enterprises (Boardman and
Vining, 1989; Muehlenkamp, 2013). This is
because measuring improved profitability
alone does not include the welfare implications
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of ownership, as it may entail either an improvement
in cost-efficiency or a deterioration in allocative
efficiency (see Armstrong et al., 1989). Empirical
evidence on the impact of ownership on cost
efficiency will generally provide a more detailed
picture (Millward and Parker, 1983; Bel et al.,
2010; Muehlenkamp, 2013).
This paper estimates the impact of ownership
on cost-efficiency by comparing the costs of
service operation between urban rail transit
systems in South Korea, seven of which were
state-owned and one privately operated. Two
important aspects of the analysis must be
highlighted. First, the focus was on cost-efficiency,
defined as an organization’s ability to produce a
well-specified output at minimum cost—
corresponding here to overall productive
efficiency as used by Kopp (1981). This is because
cost-efficiency, not allocative efficiency, is the
primary concern when firms have insufficient
profit-maximization incentives (Leibenstein,
1966); moreover, the prices charged by the eight
urban rail transit systems were similar because
they were regulated. Second, although the private
concessionaire was responsible for both operating
and constructing (including financing) the urban
rail system under a build-transfer-operate (BTO)
contract, the efficiency comparison was made
solely for service operations.
No evidence was found to indicate that private
participation helped reduce the costs of operating
the urban rail transit system. The evidence
suggests that expenses were higher under private
operation, although the difference was statistically
insignificant. The absence of a cost advantage
under private participation cannot be explained
by a difference in service quality, as accident
frequency did not differ between the two cases
considered. The paper explains why risk-sharing
between the government and private
concessionaire may greatly weaken the
concessionaire’s incentive to cut service operation
costs if there are negative externalities across
different project stages.
PPP and urban rail transit in South Korea
Eight South Korean urban rail transit systems
(or companies) were studied, of which one was
privately operated under a PPP contract. As of
2013, six cities in South Korea operated separate
rail transit systems, with Seoul Metropolitan City
owning by far the largest urban rail transit
network—indeed, Seoul’s metro is the world’s
longest in terms of passenger-route length.
Seoul’s urban rail transit system began in 1974.
As of 2013, it had nine lines of operation, owned
and operated by three different companies, one
of which is privately operated. All of South
Korea’s other urban rail transit systems are
operated by city governments.
Since 2009, one of the nine lines in Seoul
(line 9) has been operated by Metro 9—a special
purpose vehicle (SPV) designed to build and
operate the line and fully owned by a consortium
of private companies, with Hyundai Rotem and
the Australian firm Macquarie as its two largest
shareholders. Seoul Metropolitan City granted
Metro 9 (hereafter the ‘project company’) a 30-
year concession with exclusive rights to operate
line 9.
This PPP contract had the two characteristics
of a typical PPP: (1) bundling of different stages
of the project; and (2) risk-sharing between
public and private partners. The contract
bundled the construction, financing, and
operation of line 9 into a BTO contract.
Specifically, the contract between the project
company and the government stipulated that
the company would construct line 9, transfer the
constructed infrastructure to the government
and, in return, obtain the rights to operate the
line for 30 years. The project company contracted
out construction and financing to its shareholders
and the operation of line 9 to another private
company, Metro 9 Operation (‘the operator’),
also partly owned by a shareholder. Thus, the
project company’s shareholders belonged to one
of two groups: those providing construction
(‘construction shareholders’) and financial
(‘financial shareholders’) services. Hyundai
Rotem, the largest shareholder, was a
construction shareholder and partly owned the
operator.
The contract specified a significant level of
risk-sharing between the government and the
consortium through a minimum revenue
guarantee (MRG) agreement and a soft budget
constraint with a high level of autonomy for the
consortium to renegotiate fares. The MRG
agreement specified that the government would
guarantee a certain level of projected annual
after-tax revenue (8.9% of the capital invested)
for the first 15 years: 90% for the first five years,
80% for the second five years, and 70% for the
remaining five years. Furthermore, the contract
was incomplete in that it did not specify ex ante
the pricing structures for conceivable
contingencies but rather granted the project
company considerable autonomy to renegotiate
fare increases if a significant loss were to occur.
The PPP operated as follows:
•First, the Hyundai Rotem consortium created
a project company as an SPV to distance itself
from the liabilities and obligations associated
with the project.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [Y
on
se
i U
niv
ers
ity
] a
t 1
7:0
1 1
1 J
uly
 20
16
 
PUBLIC MONEY & MANAGEMENT SEPTEMBER 2016
449
© 2016 CIPFA
•Second, the project company signed a
concession agreement with the Seoul
government and then subcontracted the
construction, financing, and operation with
the construction shareholders, financial
shareholders, and operator, respectively.
•Third, the construction shareholders built the
infrastructure and were paid by the project
company.
•Fourth, the financial shareholders financed the
project company’s debt and received interest
revenue.
Currently, the operator continues to provide
transport services, receives fees from the project
company, and pays dividends to Hyundai Rotem
(the project company’s largest shareholder). Any
losses incurred by the project company are partly
compensated by the government. For instance,
the MRG guarantees a minimum level of revenue,
calculated as a specified ratio of the capital invested
(including the project company’s payments to
construction and financial shareholders and the
operator). Thus, payments to subcontractors are
partially recovered through the MRG. Further,
in case the financial shareholders cannot collect
the principal, the construction shareholders can
provide collateral to them.
Hypothesis: PPP and cost-efficiency
This paper argues that a PPP may result in cost-
inefficiency if:
•Negative externalities exist between the project
company and its shareholders. These occur
when maximizing the project company’s
profits hurts the shareholders’ profits or vice
versa.
•A high level of risk-sharing between the
government and private participants through
an MRG agreement or a soft budget constraint
that leaves the possibility of renegotiation
open.
A project company’s profits are composed of
four main parts. The first is the revenue being
paid by consumers, which is a function of the
fares paid. The second is the project company
receipts from government under the MRG
agreement. The third and fourth are the costs
paid to the project company’s shareholders
(construction and financial shareholders, as well
as the operator). The first condition, negative
externalities between the project company and
its shareholders, occurs because the project
company signs the concession but outsources all
service provision to its own shareholders. Thus,
project company costs are shareholder revenues
and maximizing the profits of the project
company by reducing costs paid to shareholders
reduces the shareholders’ profits. That is, the
combined profits of the shareholders and the
project company do not depend on the costs, as
these cancel out.
Another important point is that the profits
that shareholders realize from the PPP
arrangement are generally less transparent than
those of the project company since shareholders
do not publish separate accounting for the PPP
arrangement. As governments cannot monitor
the combined profits of the shareholders and the
project company, they often determine whether
the private party is bearing excessive risk based
on the project company’s profit. In such a case,
the second condition—a high level of risk-sharing
or a soft budget constraint with the possibility of
renegotiation—may worsen the situation. The
private partner will have an incentive to elevate
construction, financial, and operational costs
until the project company suffers a loss, then ask
government to share the risk and/or renegotiate
a fare increase.
Given this, under a PPP arrangement
characterized by these two conditions, the project
company may have an incentive to transfer its
resources to shareholders in order to receive
greater financial support from the government.
In such a case, the project company will show
unexpectedly low levels of cost-efficiency, while
its shareholders will experience very high profits.
To test this hypothesis, this paper shows that an
urban rail transit system operated under a PPP
arrangement satisfying the two conditions was
no more efficient than systems operated by SOEs.
We then present considerable suggestive but
compelling evidence that project company
shareholders experienced unusually high profits.
Empirical framework
In order to understand the impact of private
participation on the cost-efficiency of a public
mass-transit system, a simple variable cost
function in a given year was estimated, with
working expenses as the dependent variable.
Observations were from 2000 to 2013, although
the eight companies began their operations in
different years. Following Bogart and
Chaudhary (2012), a Cobb-Douglas cost
function with an indicator for private operation
was estimated:
(1) costit = a + b privateit + gcit + f(t) + ri + qi +
eit
Where costit is working expenses and cit is a set
of production outputs, including the annual
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number of passengers, route length, and
number of stations/km for urban rail transit
system i in year t. ειτ is the error term. The
dependent variable and the three output
variables are log-transformed, and costit is
deflated to 2010 values based on the consumer
price index. Region fixed effects (ρι) were also
included, also the urban rail transit system
fixed effects (θι) and time control (f(τ)), either
in a parametric or nonparametric form, to
control for any time- and system-invariant
unobserved heterogeneity. The main variable
of interest is privateit, an indicator that takes 0
if the system is operated by the project company
and 1 if it is operated by a state-owned
enterprise.
Before comparing costs between private
and public operations, the range of ‘costs’
considered in the analysis need clarification.
First, only those costs accrued only as a result
of service operation, as opposed to construction
or financing, were considered. In the case of
public sector operation, the dependent
variable, costit, is simply the cost of operating
the state-owned urban rail transit systems. It is
easily identified on each state-owned system’s
income statement as ‘operating’ expenses
(accrual-based accounting expenses excluding
non-operating costs such as interest). In the
case of the private operator, however, one
more factor has to be considered—the fee paid
by the Seoul government to the project
company according to the MRG agreement.
The Seoul government paid substantial
amounts to Metro 9 to compensate for losses
incurred when revenue fell short of the
contracted minimum. This cost to the
government must be considered as the cost of
private operation, as it would not have been
accrued under public ownership.
A concern when estimating equation (1) is
that the cost difference may simply reflect a
difference in the quality of service. To address
this concern, we use the number of accidents
that occurred in urban rail transit system i in
year t as the dependent variable to estimate the
following:
accidentit = a + b privateit + gcit + δPSDit + ri + qi
+ f(t) + eit
Where accidentit is the number of accidents and
the newly included variable (PSDit) is the
number of platform screen doors (PSDs)
installed in urban rail transit stations to improve
safety by separating the platform and the train.
In previous studies, the number of accidents
has often been used as a proxy for quality of
service because it is likely to increase if poorer-
trained, lower-paid drivers are hired (Bogart
and Chaudhary, 2012).
Data
The data sources and summary statistics of the
variables used in the analysis are shown in
table 1. The dependent variable, costit, was
from each urban rail transit system’s income
statement. For the seven state-owned systems,
the dependent variable was the operating
expenses identified from the income
statements, which are publicly available on
each system’s website. In the case of the
privately-operated system, the dependent
variable was the sum of the project company’s
operating expenses and government’s
expenditures according to the MRG
agreement. Both can be found on project
company income statements, which are publicly
available from an online platform maintained
by the South Korean government.
All right-hand side variables were collected
from public sources. Annual number of
passengers, route length (in km), and number
of stations/km were published on each system’s
website. The annual number of accidents was
collected from Railway Industry Information
Center’s website. The number of PSDs installed
was collected using South Korea’s Open Public
Information Initiative, which allows any citizen
to request public data through a government-
maintained website. All variables were log
transformed.
Table 1. Data sources and summary statistics.
Variable (in logs) Data source N Mean SD Min. Max.
Working expenses Each subway system’s income statement 73 26.19 1.05 24.01 27.88
No. of passengers Each subway system’s website 73 18.98 1.48 16.16 21.14
Route length (km) Each subway system’s website 73 3.92 0.88 2.37 5.09
No. of stations/km Each subway system’s website 73 3.89 0.84 2.48 5.06
No. of accidents Railway Industry Information Center
(www.kric.or.kr) 60 1.28 1.25 0 4.20
No. of platform screen doors Open Public Information Initiative
(wonmun.open.go.kr) 60 2.64 1.31 0 5.06
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Table 2 presents three key variables
(number of passengers, route length, and
number of stations) for the eight systems
analysed. To compare costs between private
and public operators, Seoul Metropolitan
Rapid Transit (SMRT) was chosen as the main
public comparison group. This SOE is one of
three rail transit systems operating in Seoul
(aside from the project company and the other
SOE, Seoul Metro). As shown in table 2, the
project company (Metro 9) was more
comparable in terms of the three presented
variables with systems operating in smaller
cities, such as Incheon, than with SMRT.
Nevertheless, SMRT was chosen for the
comparison because interviews with Seoul
government and SMRT officials suggested that
SMRT is a plausible counterfactual of private
operation: if line 9 had not been privately
operated through the PPP, it would have been
operated by SMRT.
Although SMRT was the main comparison
group, costs of private operation were
compared to those of Seoul Metro, the other
public system operating in Seoul. This was
because the three Seoul systems (Seoul Metro,
SMRT, and Metro 9) share a common political,
social, and economic environment, which may
significantly affect their service costs. For
instance, a given urban rail transit system is
closely regulated by the government of the city
in which it operates. Labour markets are also
regionally fragmented, suggesting that
workforce productivity varies across regions.
Such factors may significantly impact operating
costs and so comparing the three Seoul systems
meant that it was possible to control for their
effects and focus on the impact of private
versus public operation.
Results
Cost inefficiency of the project company
Tables 3 and 4 present the results of estimating
equations (1) and (2), respectively. All
specifications include firm and region fixed
effects in order to control for time-invariant
but firm- or region-specific unobserved
heterogeneity (for example regional labour
market differences or energy costs). When
including firm dummies, the dummy for either
the Seoul Metro (in columns 4–6) or SMRT (in
columns 1–3) was dropped, making one the
reference group and avoiding
multicollinearity. The estimated coefficients
on privateit in equations (1) and (2) thus
represent the project company’s advantage
(or disadvantage) in cost and number of
accidents, respectively, compared to those of
either Seoul Metro (columns 1–3) or SMRT
(columns 4–6).
Table 3 reports the results of estimating
equation (1). Columns 1 and 2 suggest that
working expenses were about 15% lower for
the privately-operated urban rail transit system
compared to Seoul Metro, which operates lines
1 through 4. However, this cost advantage
disappeared once when nonparametric time
controls were included in column 3. In columns
4–6, on the other hand, the privately-operated
urban rail transit is compared to SMRT and
the cost advantage of private operation is no
longer observed. All three specifications, using
different types of time controls, show positive
coefficients on privateit, suggesting that the
project company was less cost-efficient than
SMRT. Overall, working expenses were 23–
45% higher for the privately-operated line 9
compared to SMRT, which operates lines 5
through 8. However, these estimated impacts
were statistically insignificant in all three
specifications.
Service quality of the project company
Table 4 addresses the concern that the results
documented in table 3 may simply reflect a
difference in service quality. The results in
table 4 indicate no clear difference between
private operation and the two benchmark cases
Table 2. Urban rail transit companies in South Korea.
City Firm Operating Data Annual No. Route No. of
from: collected of passengers length (km) stations
from: (2012 in millions) (2012) (2012)
Busan Busan Transportation 1985 2007 309.0 107.8 108
Daegu Daegu Metropolitan Transit 1997 2006 126.7 57 59
Daejon Daejon Metropolitan Express Transit 2006 2006 38.6 20.5 22
Incheon Incheon Transit 1999 2000 90.6 29 29
Kwangju Gwangju Metropolitan Rapid Transit 2004 2006 13.5 20.5 20
Seoul Metro 9 2009 2009 124.8 27 25
Seoul Seoul Metro 1974 2001 1,514.0 137.9 120
Seoul Seoul Metropolitan Rapid Transit
(SMRT) 1996 2004 921.2 162.2 157
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Table 3. Effect of private participation on working expenses.
        Dependent variable: working expenses (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private participation (line 9) -0.156 -0.147 0.007 0.233 0.247 0.447
(0.260) (0.265) (0.288) (0.288) (0.299) (0.303)
No. of passengers (log) 0.326** 0.324** 0.289** 0.326** 0.324** 0.289**
(0.128) (0.131) (0.127) (0.128) (0.131) (0.127)
Route length (log) 0.784** 0.794** 0.926** 0.784** 0.794** 0.926**
(0.215) (0.223) (0.203) (0.215) (0.223) (0.203)
No. of stations per length (log) 0.966** 0.972** 1.263** 0.966** 0.972** 1.263**
(0.449) (0.462) (0.470) (0.449) (0.462) (0.470)
SMRT (lines 5–8) -0.389** -0.394** -0.440**
(0.125) (0.132) (0.133)
Seoul Metro (lines 1–4) 0.389** 0.394** 0.440**
(0.125) (0.132) (0.133)
Time controls Linear Quadratic Nonparametric Linear Quadratic Nonparametric
N 73 73 73 73 73 73
Adjusted R2 0.980 0.980 0.985 0.980 0.980 0.985
Note: Cost efficiency of private participation is compared against either Seoul Metro (columns 1–3) or SMRT (columns 4–6). Robust standard errors
are given in parentheses. All specifications include region and firm fixed effects to control for heterogeneity. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05.
Table 4. Effect of private participation on accident incidence.
          Dependent variable: No. of accidents (log)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Private participation (line 9) 1.259 -0.474 -0.460 2.357 0.610 0.522
(1.185) (1.090) (1.102) (1.473) (1.349) (1.337)
No. of platform screen doors (log) -0.374** -0.544** -0.530** -0.374** -0.544** -0.530**
(0.108) (0.107) (0.0994) (0.108) (0.107) (0.0994)
No. of passengers (log) -0.165 -0.203 -0.141 -0.165 -0.203 -0.141
(0.356) (0.391) (0.438) (0.356) (0.391) (0.438)
Route length (log) 2.425** 1.584* 1.467 2.425** 1.584* 1.467
(0.923) (0.874) (0.898) (0.923) (0.875) (0.898)
No. of stations/km (log) 1.371 1.916 1.431 1.371 1.916 1.431
(3.084) (3.064) (3.213) (3.084) (3.064) (3.213)
Seoul Metro (lines 1–4) -1.099* -1.083* -0.982
(0.634) (0.605) (0.633)
SMRT (lines 5–8) 1.099* 1.083* 0.982
(0.634) (0.605) (0.633)
Time controls Linear Quadratic Nonparametric Linear Quadratic Nonparametric
N 60 60 60 60 60 60
R2 0.784 0.812 0.819 0.784 0.812 0.819
Note: Cost efficiency of private participation is compared against either Seoul Metro (columns 1–3) or SMRT (columns 4–6). Robust standard errors
are given in parentheses. All specifications include region and firm fixed effects to control for heterogeneity. *p < 0.10; **p < 0.05
of state ownership with regard to the number
of accidents. The estimated coefficient signs
indicate that the number of accidents was
higher on the privately-operated line 9 when
compared to SMRT, but this was statistically
insignificant. In table 4, the number of PSDs
installed is added to the right-hand side
variables used in table 3 and explains a
substantial part of the variation in the number
of accidents: a 10% increase in the number of
PSDs was associated with a 4–5% decrease in
the number of accidents.
Overall, no evidence was found that private
operation led to clear and significant declines
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in the cost of public service provision; private
operation decreased costs slightly compared
to Seoul Metro but showed no cost advantage
compared to SMRT. As noted above, SMRT
serves as a better comparison group than Seoul
Metro, as it was the most likely alternative
operator of line 9. Furthermore, SMRT and
Metro 9 may also share commonalities in terms
of technology and cost structure, as their
systems were constructed more recently than
that of Seoul Metro. Thus, SMRT’s cost level is
the best available measure of the cost of the
alternative to private operation.
High shareholder profits
Metro 9 shareholders realized surprisingly
high profits from building infrastructure,
financing construction, and operating the
metro line. The return on equity was 66% in
2009, 84% in 2010, and 79% in 2011. In
contrast, during the three-year period, the
project company suffered substantial losses
and, as a result, received significant financial
support from the government due to a
generous MRG agreement. The shareholders’
high profitability is not limited to operations.
Although we lack the data to say whether
construction costs were bloated, the financial
fees were clearly generously set. The project
company paid interest expenses ranging from
7.2% to 15% to the shareholders despite the
sovereign bond interest rate being only about
4% at the time.
Conclusions and limitations
PPPs have often been described as ‘the best of
both worlds’. To test this claim, this paper
examined whether a PPP in South Korea’s
urban rail transit system led to an improvement
in cost-efficiency. The privately-operated line
9 was found to be less cost-efficient than the
publicly-managed SMRT, a benchmark SOE
that would have managed line 9 in the absence
of the PPP contract.
This finding was related to the two defining
characteristics of a PPP contract: risk-sharing
and bundling. Under a PPP arrangement that
exhibits negative externalities between the
project company and its shareholders and a
high level of risk-sharing between public and
private participants, the project company may
transfer its resources to shareholders in order
to show losses and receive financial support
from government. Added to this, private
shareholders’ company accounts tend to be
much less transparent than public sector
accounts. The findings from the research for
this paper suggest that the structure of a typical
PPP contract may distort incentives for cost
management. The fact that private partners
want to maximize profit does not guarantee
that the resulting public service will be more
cost-efficient.
Possible limitations
The study had some imitations, which need to
be noted. First, the focus was on operating costs
when examining cost-efficiency. So it is possible
that construction or financial costs may be
lower under private provision. However, this
seems unlikely at least in the case of financial
costs, given that PPPs cost more per dollar of
financing—the so-called ‘PPP premium’—than
government debt (Kay, 1993; Klein, 1997).
Second, relatively short-term performance was
evaluated (the first five years of operation).
However, theory suggests that bundling may
incentivize the concessionaire to minimize long-
term life-cycle costs, as it may consider
minimizing operational costs when building
the infrastructure (Hart, 2003; Engel et al.,
2010). This possibility cannot be ruled out
because the analysis did not cover the full 30-
year contracted period.
Another issue is whether most PPP
contracts really do include risk-sharing and
bundling. Suggestive evidence, as well as a
rough survey of large-scale PPPs in South
Korea, both show that such contracts are
common. And these PPP contracts are widely
found in other countries, especially in the
transport industry. These contracts may be
the reason behind to large number of
renegotiations observed worldwide (Guasch,
2004).
What can governments do to prevent the private
sector making excessive profits?
One option is to not to write PPP contracts with
negative externalities or high risk-sharing. In
fact, in response to an unexpectedly high level
of expenditures due to MRG agreements, the
South Korean government recently issued an
amendment that bans them in newly-
contracted PPPs. Another (and perhaps better)
option is to correct the information asymmetry
by revising accounting standards to make the
shareholders of project company publish
separate accounting information for the PPP
project.
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IMPACT
This paper explains why PPPs set up as build-transfer-operate (BTO) contracts often fail to
achieve cost-efficiency. In the transport case studied, private shareholders were able to
make very high profits, whereas the government partner spent more under a minimum
revenue guarantee (MRG) agreement than originally budgeted. This was the result of
activity bundling and public-private risk-sharing, which can significantly weaken a
concessionaire’s incentives to reduce costs. At the very least, after reading this paper,
governments should not be writing PPP contracts with MRG agreements.
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